# Compute9 Preflight v0.1.0

Free offline research software. No GPU access, network requests, workload uploads, payment or benchmark execution.

## Download and reproduce

Use Node.js >=22. Download BOTH files into the same directory:
- https://gpu9d.com/downloads/compute9-preflight.cjs
- https://gpu9d.com/downloads/compute9-evidence.cjs

Read https://gpu9d.com/downloads/manifest.json for exact SHA-256, byte counts and dependencies. Inspect source and compare each file with the manifest before running it. Checksums detect byte differences; a manifest served by the same origin is not an independent authenticity certificate.

Run a self-contained demonstration:

    node compute9-preflight.cjs demo

This uses a fresh self-generated Ed25519 key and a fixed simulated 2030 clock. It proves only a local software path; it does not represent a supplier, valid real-world consent or a GPU test. Private keys are not exported.

Check local documents using the current system clock:

    node compute9-preflight.cjs check --consent-file consent.json --plan-file plan.json --trusted-key-file provider-public.pem

No server submission endpoint exists. Keep documents local. Limits: consent bundle 16 KiB, plan 8 KiB, public key 512 bytes. Success writes JSON to stdout; rejected input writes a short JSON error to stderr and exits nonzero without echoing document contents.

## Contract and signature

Consent schema: https://gpu9d.com/schemas/compute9-consent-v0.1.schema.json
Plan schema: https://gpu9d.com/schemas/compute9-test-plan-v0.1.schema.json
Schemas check structure; the CLI additionally checks signatures, dates and cross-document constraints.

Consent includes random UUID resource/consent references, UTC validity window, allowed actions, per-plan duration/VRAM/utilization/power caps, explicitly allowed publication fields and spending_authorized:false. These documents cannot authorize spending. No account, address, hardware serial, command, prompt, weights, outputs or workload data is accepted.

A signer signs the UTF-8 bytes of `GPU9D/Compute9 consent v0.1` followed by one newline and the canonical consent object, using Ed25519. Canonical encoding is the same sorted-key, safe-integer-only subset implemented by compute9-evidence.cjs. The signature is 64 bytes encoded as standard base64; the public key is Ed25519 SPKI PEM. Signature generation is not exposed as an ownership-enrolment service.

Obtain the trusted public key independently from the authorized resource owner. The CLI requires a separate pin file and compares the key bytes before verifying the signature. Copying a key from an unverified consent document provides no independent trust. A valid signature proves a corresponding key signed the document; it does not prove the signer owns a GPU or is legally authorized to lend it.

The plan must reference that resource, use an allowed action, fit every cap and finish before consent expires. Publication fields must be a subset of the signed whitelist. All six stop conditions are mandatory: consent_expired, duration_limit, vram_limit, gpu_utilization_limit, power_limit, manual_stop. Unknown fields, duplicates and ambiguous numeric budgets are rejected.

## Enforcement and threat boundaries

No runner exists in this release. Declaring stop conditions does not enforce them. Output always says execution_enabled:false, limits_enforced_by_runner:false, gpu_test_performed:false and resource_ownership_verified:false. A future authorized runner must actually monitor and enforce each limit, handle unavailable sensor metrics by refusing the test, and stop on withdrawal or operator request. Monitoring permission and apparent idle utilization never authorize active tests.

This version checks per-plan document caps only. It has no revocation lookup, replay protection, cumulative budget ledger, trusted timestamp or persistent identity binding. Reusing the same consent for repeated plans is not prevented; output explicitly marks these gaps. Compromised keys, a false local clock, and fabricated supplier claims are outside its proof. Do not use this document check alone to enable execution. Supplier approval must separately cover hardware use, schedule, safety and zero-cost conditions; no paid test is authorized by this tool.

The existing evidence tool checks chain integrity and checkpoint signatures, not measurement truth or full-history completeness. Neither tool confers C2/C3/C4 evidence levels. Actual suppliers, GPU tests, connections and independent AI adoption remain unverified; the production capacity directory remains empty.